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Abstract—In this paper, we provide a formal framework for the
security of distributed active objects. Active objects communicate
asynchronously implementing method calls via futures. We base
the formal framework on a security model that uses a semi-
lattice to enable multi-lateral security crucial for distributed
architectures. We further provide a security type system for the
programming model ASPfun of functional active objects. Type
safety and a confinement property are presented. ASPfun thus
realizes secure down calls.
Index Terms—Distributed active objects, formalization, secu-
rity type systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Formal models for actor systems become increasingly im-
portant for the security analysis of distributed applications.
For example, models of organisational structures together with
actors provide a basis for the analysis of insider threats, [44],
[45].
Active objects define a programming model similar to actors
[4] but closely related to object-orientation. An object is an ac-
tive object if it serves as an access point to its own methods and
associated (passive) objects and their threads. Consequently,
every call to those methods will be from outside. These remote
calls are collected in a list of requests. The unit comprising
the object’s methods and attributes and its current requests
is called activity. The activity serves as a unit of distribution
since it has a data space separate from its environment and
can process requests independently. To enable asynchronous
communication between distributed active objects, the concept
of futures – promises for method call values – is used. Active
objects are practically implemented in the Java API ProActive
[14] developed by Inria and commercialized by its spin-off
ActiveEON. Active objects are also a tangible abstraction
for distributed information systems beyond just one specific
language. ASP [15] is a calculus for active objects. ASP
has been simplified into ASPfun – a calculus of functional
active objects. ASPfun is formalized in Isabelle/HOL [28] thus
providing a general automated framework for the exploration
of properties of active objects.
In this paper, we use this framework to support security
specification and analysis of active objects. The contributions
of this paper are (a) the formalization of a novel security
model for distributed active objects that supports multi-lateral
security, (b) a type system for the static security analysis for
ASPfun configurations, (c) preservation and the simple security
property of confinement for well-typed configurations, (d) and
an argument that secure down calls are possible for ASPfun.
The novel security model [32] is tailored to active objects
as it supports decentralized privacy specification of data in
distributed entities. This is commonly known as multi-lateral
security. To achieve it we break away from the classical dogma
of lattices of security classes and use instead semi-lattices.
In our model, we implement confinement. Every object can
remotely access only public (L) methods of other activities.
Methods can be specified as private (H) in an activity forbid-
ding direct access. All other methods of objects are assumed to
be L, partitioning methods locally into L and H . The security
policy further forbids local information flow from H to L. To
access an L-method remotely, the containing activity must also
be visible to the calling activity in a configuration. In ASPfun,
this visibility relation is implemented by activity references.
In other active object programming languages, visibility could
be given alternatively by an import relation or a registry.
In this paper, we provide an implementation of this security
model in the ASPfun framework to illustrate its feasibility and
the applicability of the ASPfun framework.
We design a security type system for ASPfun that im-
plements a type check for a security specification of active
objects and visibility. We prove the preservation property for
type safety of the type system guaranteeing that types are
not changed by the evaluation of an ASPfun configuration.
The specification of parts of an active object as confined,
or private (or H), is possible at the discretion of the user.
This specification is entered as a security assignment into the
type system; by showing a general theorem that confinement
is entailed in well-typedness, we thus know that a well-typed
program provides confinement of private methods. Although
the confinement property intuitively suffices for security, at
this point, a formal security proof is still missing. Moreover,
implicit flows may occur. We thus provide a definition of
noninterference for active objects. Based on that, we prove
that a well-typed configuration does not leak information to
active objects below in the hierarchy of the security model,
i.e., multi-lateral security holds for well-typed configurations.
Remote method calls in ASPfun have no side-effects. Hence,
secure down calls can be made. Confinement provides that
no private information is accessed remotely and side-effect
freedom guarantees that through the call no information from
the caller side is leaked. Side effects are excluded in our
formal model ASPfun because it is functional but this can be
implemented into the run-time system of other active object
languages.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
5.
08
67
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  5
 M
ay
 20
14
Fig. 1. Joins enable Top control in MLS models
Overview
We first review the semi-lattice for multi-lateral security
(Section II-A) and ASPfun (Section II-B) introducing a running
example of private sorting (Section II-C). Next, we describe
how the semi-lattice model can be applied to active objects
by instantiating it for ASPfun(Section III). We discuss secure
down calls, a distinctive feature of ASPfun enabled by its
functional nature and that moreover does not restrict common
bi-directional communication patterns. To show the latter
point, we present how to implement the Needham-Schroeder
Public Key protocol in ASPfun. We describe what we mean by
security, i.e., the attacker model and the information flows be-
tween active objects through method calls (Section III-C) and
illustrate their enforcement on the running example. Following
that, we present a type system for the static analysis of a con-
figuration of active objects in ASPfun (Section IV). Properties
of this type system are presented (Section V): (a) preservation
as a standard result of type safety and (b) confinement. We
then define noninterference and multi-lateral security formally
to present a soundness theorem, i.e., well-typed configurations
are multi-lateral secure. We finish the paper with a related
work section and also give some conclusions (Section VI).
An Appendix contains sections A . . . E with formal details,
more examples, and (full) proofs.
II. PREREQUISITES
A. Semi-Lattice Model for Privacy
We abstract the confinement property known from object
oriented languages, e.g., private/public in Java, and use it
as a blueprint for a model of privacy in distributed objects.
Consider Figure 1: multi-level security models support strict
hierarchies like military organization (left); multi-lateral secu-
rity [5, Ch. 8] is intended to support a decentralized security
world where parties A to E share resources without a strict
hierarchy (right) thereby granting privacy at the discretion of
each party. But lattice-based security models usually achieve
the middle schema: since a lattice has joins, there is a security
class A unionsq B unionsq C unionsq D unionsq E that has unrestricted access to all
classes A to E. For a truely decentralized multi-lateral security
model this top element is considered harmful. To realize
confinement, we exclude the top element by excluding joins
from the lattice. We thereby arrive at an algebraic structure
called a semi-lattice in which meets always exist but not joins.
Semi-Lattice: The semi-lattice of security classes for active
objects is a combination of global and local security lattices.
The two lattices are used to classify the methods into groups
and objects into hierarchies.
1) Local Classification: The local classification is used to
control the information flow inside an object, where methods
are called and executed. For every active object there is the
public (L) and a private (H) level partitioning the set of this
active object’s methods. The order relation of the lattice for
local classification is the relation ≤ defined on {L,H} as
{(L,L), (L,H), (H,H)}.
2) Global Classification: The purpose of the global classi-
fication is to control the course of information flows between
methods of globally distributed objects and lead their informa-
tion together in a common dominating activity. To remotely
access active objects, the key is their identity (we use α, β
to denote identities). As classes for the global lattice we use
subsets of the set of all activity identities I. These subsets of
compartments build the lattice of global classes, the powerset
lattice P(I) over activity identities I.
(P(I),∩,∪,⊆,∅, I)
In a concrete configuration, the global class label of an activity
is the set of activity identities to which access is granted.
For example, with respect to the Hasse diagram in Figure 2,
an object at global level {α, β} ∈ P(I) can access any part
(method) of an object labeled as {β} or {α} or {} but only if
this part is additionally labeled as L. Vice versa an object at
level {α} can neither access L nor H parts of objects at level
{β} nor any parts at level {α, β} but only L parts at level {}.
Thus the classification of parts of an active object needs to
combine labels.
3) Combination of Lattices: The security model of the
semi-lattice needs to combine the local and global classifica-
tion scheme. As result, a security class is a pair of local and
global class (S, δ). We want to impose confinement of methods
in order to realize multi-lateral security with our model. Thus,
we have to define the combination of the two constituting
lattices such that its order relation corresponds to a multi-
lateral information flow relation. I.e., private methods of an
object are not accessible by any other than the object itself.
Consequently, the new order for security classes is defined
as follows. The combined security class ordering for active
objects is defined such that a method class (H, δ) dominates
(L, δ) and also (L, δ′) for all δ′ ⊆ δ but no other (X, δ0)
dominates (H, δ). The combination of local and global types
into pairs gives a partial order
CL ≡ ({L,H} × P(I),v)
with
(S0, I0) v (S1, I1) ≡
(
S0 <S S1 ∨ S0 = S1 = L
I0 ⊆ I1
)
where the vertical notation
(
φ
ξ
)
abbreviates φ ∧ ξ and <S=
{(L,H)} denotes the strict ordering on the local security
classes. Consequently, meets exist but no joins. The partial
order CL is thus just a semi-lattice as illustrated by an example
in Figure 2 (right).
Fig. 2. Taking the top off MLS lattice (left) leads to semi-lattice (right).
B. Functional Active Objects: ASPfun
ASPfun uses a slightly extended form of the simplest ς-
calculus from the Theory of Objects [1] by distributing ς-
calculus objects into activities. The calculus ASPfun is func-
tional because method update is realized on a copy of the
active object: there are no side-effects.
1) ς-calculus: Objects consist of a set of labeled methods
[li = ς(y)b]
i∈1..n. Attributes are considered as methods not
using the parameters. The calculus features method call t.l(s)
and method update t.l := ς(y)b on objects where ς is the
binder for the method parameter y. Every method may also
contain a “this” element representing the surrounding object.
Note, that the “this” is usually [1] expressed as an additional
parameter x to each method’s ς scope but we use for this
exposition literally this to facilitate the understanding. It is,
however, important to bear in mind that formally this is a
variable representing a copy of the current object and that this
variable is scoped as a local variable for each object. The ς-
calculus is Turing complete, e.g. it can simulate the λ-calculus.
We illustrate the ς-calculus by our example below.
2) Syntax of ASPfun: ASPfun is a minimal extension of the
ς-calculus by one single additional primitive, the Active, for
creating an activity. In the syntax (see Table I) we distinguish
between underlined constructs representing the static syntax
that may be used by a programmer, while futures and active
object references are created at runtime. We use the naming
s, t ::= x variable
| this generic object reference
| [lj = ς(yj)tj ]j∈1..n (∀j, this 6= yj) object definition
| s.li(t) (i ∈ 1..n) method call
| s.li := ς(y)t (i ∈ 1..n, this 6= y) update
| Active(s) Active object creation
| α active object reference
| fi future
TABLE I
ASPFUN SYNTAX
convention s, t for ς-terms, α, β for active objects, fk, fj for
futures, Qα, Qβ for request queues.
3) Futures: A future can intuitively be described as a
promise for the result of a method call. The concept of
futures has been introduced in Multilisp [26] and enables
asynchronous processing of method calls in distributed appli-
cations: on calling a method a future is immediately returned
to the caller enabling the continuation of the computation at
the caller side. Only if the method call’s value is needed, a
so-called wait-by-necessity may occur. Futures identify the
results of asynchronous method invocations to an activity.
Technically, we can see a future as a pair consisting of a future
reference and a future value. The future reference points to
the future value which is the instance of a method call in the
request queue of a remote activity. In the following, we will
use future and future reference synonymously for simplicity.
Futures can be transmitted between activities. Thus different
activities can use the same future.
4) Configuration: A configuration is a set of activities
C ::= αi[(fj 7→ sj)j∈Ii , ti]i∈1..p
where {Ii} are disjoint subsets of N. The unordered list
(fj 7→ sj)j∈Ii represents the request queue, ti the active
object, and αi ∈ dom(C) the activity reference. A config-
uration represents the “state”of a distributed system by the
current parallel activities. Computation is now the state change
induced by the evaluation of method calls in the request
queues of the activities. Since ASPfun is functional, the local
active object does not change – it is immutable – but the
configuration is changed globally by the stepwise computation
of requests and the creation of new activities.
The constructor Active(t) activates the object t by creating
a new activity in which the object t becomes active object.
Although the active object of an activity is immutable, an
update operation on activities is provided. It performs an
update on a freshly created copy of the active object placing
it into a new activity with empty request queue; the invoking
context receives the new activity reference in return. If we
want to model operations that change active objects, we can
do so using the update. Although the changes are not literally
performed on the original objects, a state change can thus be
implemented at the level of configurations (for examples see
[28]). Efficiency is not the goal of ASPfun rather minimality
of representation with respect to the main decisive language
features of active objects while being fully formal.
5) Results, Programs and Initial Configuration: A term is
a result, i.e., a totally evaluated term, if it is either an object
(like in [1]) or an activity reference. We consider results as
values.
In a usual programming language, a programmer does
not write configurations but usual programs invoking some
distribution or concurrency primitives (in ASPfun Active is the
only such primitive). This is reflected by the ASPfun syntax
given above. A “program” is a term s0 given by this static
syntax (it has no future or active object reference and no free
variable). In order to be evaluated, this program must be placed
in an initial configuration. The initial configuration has a single
activity with a single request consisting of the user program:
initConf(s0) = α[f0 7→ s0, []]
Sets of data that can be used as values are indispensable if we
want to reason about information flows. In ASPfun, such values
can be represented as results (see above) to any configuration
either by explicit use of some corresponding object terms or
by appropriate extension of the initial configuration that leads
to the set-up of a data base of basic datatypes, like integers or
strings.
6) Informal Semantics of ASPfun: Syntactically, ASPfun
merely extends the ς-calculus by a second parameter for
methods (the first being this) and the Active primitive but the
latter gives rise to a completely new semantic layer for the
evaluation of distributed activities in a configuration.
Local semantics (the relation →ς ) and the parallel (config-
uration) semantics (the relation →‖) are given by the set of
reduction rules informally described as follows (see Appendix
C for the formal semantics).
• CALL, UPDATE, LOCAL: the local reduction relation →ς
is based on the ς-calculus.
• ACTIVE: Active(t) creates a new activity α, with t as its
active object, global new name α, and initially no futures;
in ASPfun notation this is α[∅, t].
• REQUEST, SELF-REQUEST: a method call β.l(t) creates a
new future fk for the method l of active object β placing
the resulting future value onto β’s request queue; the
future fk can be used to refer to the future value β.l(t)
at any time.
• REPLY: returns result, i.e., replaces future fk by the
referenced result term, i.e., the future value resulting from
some β.l(t).
• UPDATE-AO: active object update creates a copy of the
active object and updates the active object of the copy –
the original remains the same (functional active objects
are immutable).
C. Running Example: Private Sorting
As an example for a standard program consider the im-
plementation of quicksort as an active object χ illustrated in
Figure 3. The operations we use are :: for list cons, @ for
list append, # for list length, hd for the list head, and a let
construct (see [28] for details on their implementation).
χ
[
∅,
[qsort = ς(y) if y = [] then []
else let (a :: l) = y
(l1, l2) = this.part (a, l)
l′1 = if #l1≤1 then l1 else this.qsort(l1)
l′2 = if #l2≤1 then l2 else this.qsort(l2)
in l′1@[a]@l′2
end,
part = ς(p, y) if y = [] then ([], [])
else let (a::l) = y
(l1, l2) = this.part (p, l)
in if p<a.ord then (l1, a::l2) else (a::l1, l2)
end
]
]
The quick sort algorithm in χ is parametric over a method
“ord”, a numerical value, that is used in method “part”. This
method ord is assumed to be available uniformly in the target
objects contained in the list that shall be sorted. We omit the
parameter to calls of ord because it is unused, i.e., the empty
object [].
The following controller object α holds a list of active
objects (for example [β1, β2, β3] in Figure 3 but generally
arbitrary thus represented as . . . below). Controller α uses the
Fig. 3. Three active objects β1, β2, β3 in controller α’s list.
quick sort algorithm provided by χ to sort this list on execution
of the manage method.
α
[
∅, [manage = ς(y)this.sort(this.list),
sort = ς(y) χ.qsort(y),
list = . . .]
]
The target objects contained in α′s list (omitted) are active
objects of the kind of β below. Here, the n in the body of
method ord is an integer specific to β and the field income
shall represent some private confidential data in β.
β
[
∅, [ord = ς(y)n, income = . . .]
]
If active objects of the kind of β represent principals in
the system, it becomes clear what is the privacy challenge:
the controller object α should be able to sort his list of β-
principals without learning anything about their private data,
here income.
III. SEMI-LATTICE MODEL FOR ASPFUN
As a proof of concept, we show that the calculus of func-
tional active objects ASPfun gives rise to a fairly straightfor-
ward implementation of the security semi-lattice by mapping
the concepts of the security model onto language concepts as
follows.
• The global class ordering on sets of activity identities
corresponds to the sets of activity references that are
accessible from within an activity. We name this ac-
cessibility relation visibility (see Definition 3.1). It is a
consequence of the structure of a configuration thereby
at the discretion of the configuration programmer.
• The local classification of methods into public L and
private H methods is specified as an additional security
assignment mapping method names to {L,H} at the
discretion of the user.
• Based on these two devices for specifying and imple-
menting a security policy with active objects we devise
as a practical verification tool a security type system
for ASPfun. The types of this type system correspond
quite closely to the security classes of the semi-lattice
defined in Section II-A: object types are pairs of security
assignment maps and global levels.
A. Assigning Security Classes to Active Objects
Visibility: We define visibility as the “distributed part” of
the accessibility within a configuration. It derives from the
activity references and thus represents the global security
specification as programmed into a configuration.
Definition 3.1 (Visibility): Let C be a configuration with a
security specification sec partitioning the methods of each of
C’s active objects locally into H and L methods. Then, the
relation ≤V I is inductively defined on activity references by
the following two cases.(
β[Qβ , [li = ς(y)ti]
i∈1..n] ∈ C
sec(li) = L ∧ ti = E[α]
)
⇒ α ≤V I β(
β[Qβ , [li = ς(y)ti]
i∈1..n] ∈ C
sec(li) = L ∧ ti = E[γ] ∧ α ≤V I γ
)
⇒ α ≤V I β
We use the vertical notation
(
φ
ξ
)
to abbreviate φ∧ξ; for context
variable E see Appendix C. We then define the relation called
visibility vsecC as the reflexive transitive closure over ≤V I for
any C, sec. 
We denote the visibility range using Definition 3.1 as
V Isec(α,C) ≡ {β ∈ dom(C) | β vsecC α}. The visibility
relation extends naturally to a relation v on global levels:
every activity α ∈ C may be assigned the global level corre-
sponding to the union of all its visible activities V Isec(α,C).
This relation is a subrelation of the subset relation on the
powerset of activity identities introduced before and thus also a
partial order. We use it as the semantics of the subtype relation
in Section IV.
Assigning Security Classes to Example: To illustrate how
activities are labeled in the semi-lattice model using visibility,
consider the running example above where we assume the
list in controller α to contain various active object references
[β0, . . . , βn]. We assign to each activity the global class
containing its own identity and those of all its visible activities.
For our example, the global class of controller α would be the
following.
δα = {α} ∪ δχ ∪
⋃
i=0..n
δβi
The global classes δβi of the βi objects and δχ in turn contain
all their visible objects’ classes. Thus, the global classes are
ordered δβi ⊆ δα for all i and δχ ⊆ δα. The security
classification of methods assigns pairs of global classes and
local levels to method names, for example, ordβi 7→ (L, δβi)
and incomeβi 7→ (H, δβi).
Practical Classification of Objects: The pairs (S, δ) in the
partial order CL (see Section II-A3) are the security classes
for methods of active objects. The semi-lattice is actually
defined as a partial order on object methods rather than
objects. To classify objects we consider only the global part
of the classification, i.e., the second δ component because all
methods of an active object have this δ in common. Intuitively,
this factorization corresponds to drawing objects as borders
into the semi-lattice structure (see Figure 4). These borders
represent the confinement zone of an active object.
Formally, we consider an object class to be the factorization
([li 7→ Si], δ): a pair of a security assignment to {L,H} for
each method li of an object and the object’s global class δ
common for all parts. An activity contains one active object but
may contain various passive objects. The security assignment
of an active object must be defined for all contained objects
(see rule SECASS SUBSUMPTION in Section IV).
Fig. 4. Tentatively drawing in object classes as confinement zones.
B. Secure Down Calls
In a distributed system with a nontrivial security classifi-
cation of communicating objects, secure down calls are not
possible because they would violate the security policy of
“no-down-flows” of information. In general, a method call
represents an information flow to the remote object in the form
of the request itself and the parameters passed; its response
flows information back in the form of a reply. Therefore,
secure method communication is trivially restricted to objects
of one class – otherwise one direction would contradict
the policy “no-down-flows”. This catch-22 situation can be
overcome if we exclude side-effects: the requests do not leave
traces in the remote object. In ASPfun this is given implicitly
by the semantics because requests created by method calls
in the remote object are not accessible by the remote object
itself. However, the reply may flow information up. Thus,
information does flow back, i.e. up.
As an overall result of the properties presented in this paper
we can infer that secure down calls are possible. The reasoning
is as follows. We assume as given a configuration together
with a security specification sec partitioning a portion of the
methods into public (L) and private (H). If this configuration
can be type checked according to our type system, it is secure,
i.e., we know it has confinement and is noninterfering as
we are going to see in Section V. Therefore, futures can be
securely used in higher security classes, i.e., method results
may flow up but, since no implicit flows exist, information is
not leaked in the process.
Side-effect freedom does permit to securely call down
because the call leaves no visible trace. But does this not also
exclude any mutual information exchange on the same level?
It might seem so, but fortunately, if we have two activities that
are in the same class, methods calls between them are possible
permitting bidirectional information flow. As an example, an
implementation of the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol
is given next.
Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol (NSPK) in ASPfun
This example illustrates that inside one security class mutual
information exchange is possible between different activities.
The easiest way to illustrate this is to use a protocol. We use
the corrected short form of the Needham Schroeder Public Key
Protocol (NSPK) originally published by [40]. The originally
published protocol missed out the B inside the encrypted
message to A in step two thereby giving rise to the well-
known attack of [33].
The protocol is usually written as follows using public
keys KA,KB known globally and their secret counterparts
K−1A ,K
−1
B establishing nonces NA, NB in the process of
authentication.
A→ B : {NA, A}KB
B → A : {NA, NB , B}KA
A→ B : {NB}KB
In ASPfun, the protocol is implemented as a set of methods
between two activities A and B. We omit details about decod-
ing and keys because it is clear that they can be implemented
and we want to highlight the communication process.
A = [∅,
[ownid = . . .
Bid = . . .
step1 = ς(y)
let NA = new nonce
reply = B.step2({NA, this.ownid}KB )
(N ′A, N
′
B , B
′) = K−1A (reply)
in if B′ = this.Bid ∧N ′A = NA
then (this.knows := NB).NA := NA
else this.knows := error,
step3 = ς(y)
let (N ′A, NB , B
′
id) = {y}K−1
A
if N ′A = this.NA ∧B′id = this.Bid
then {NB}KB
else this.knows := error,
knows = . . . ,
NA = . . . ]]
The protocol can be executed by invoking method A.step1
which in turn invokes the step B.step2 and A.step3.
B = [∅,
[ownid = . . .
Aid = . . .
step2 = ς(y)
let NB = new nonce
(N ′A, A
′
id) = {y}K−1
B
in if this.Aid = A′id
then let reply = A.step3({N ′A, NB , this.ownid}KA)
N ′B = {reply}K−1
B
in if N ′B = NB
then (this.knows := NA).NB := NB
else this.knows := error,
else this.knows := error,
knows = . . . ,
NB = . . . ]]
In each of the steps the nonces are created, encrypted
and tested between the method calls. If the communicated
messages adhere to the protocol, i.e., the nonces and ids
correspond to what has been sent in earlier steps, the own
nonces are updated into the methods A.NA and B.NB and
the other’s nonces in the respective method “knows”. Other-
wise, the protocol failure is recorded as “error” in method
knows. This protocol implementation illustrates that mutual
information flows are possible locally within one security
class. The type system that we present in the following Section
IV accepts this configuration since the calls are of the same
global level δ.
C. Security Analysis
In language based security, we may use the means provided
by a language to enforce security. That is, we make use
of certain security guarantees that correspond to implicit
assumptions concerning the execution of programs. The lan-
guage introduces a security perimeter because we assume that
the language compilation and run-time system are respected
(below the perimeter) while the language is responsible for
the security above the perimeter by virtue of its semantics and
other language tools, e.g. static analysis by type checking. We
now describe the security goal of confidentiality addressed
in this paper and elaborate on the attacker model for active
objects.
Security Goal Confidentiality: A computation of active
objects is an evaluation of a distributed set of mutually ref-
erencing activities. Principals that use the system can observe
the system only by using the system’s devices. We make the
simplifying assumption that principals can be identified as
activities. Principals, objects, programs and values are thus all
contained in this configuration. There are no external inputs to
this system – it is a closed system of communicating actors.
We concentrate in this paper on confidentiality, i.e. activities
should not learn anything about private parts of other activities
neither directly nor indirectly. Integrity is the dual to this
notion and we believe that it can simply be derived from our
present work by inverting the order relation.
Attacker Model: As a further consequence to the language
based approach to security, we restrict the attacker to only have
the means of the language to make his observations. Conse-
quently, we also consider the attacker – as any other principal
– as being represented by an activity. The attacker’s knowledge
is determined by all active objects he sees, more precisely their
public parts. If any of the internal computations in inaccessible
parts of other objects leak information, the attacker can learn
about them by noticing differences in different runs of the
same configuration. Inaccessible parts of other objects must
be their private methods or other objects that are referenced in
these private parts. The language semantics and the additional
static analysis must guarantee that under the assumption of
the security perimeter an attacker cannot learn anything about
private parts.
D. Information Flow Control
Information flow control [20] technically uses an informa-
tion flow policy which is given by the specification of a set of
security classes to classify information and a flow relation on
these classes that defines allowed information flows. System
entities that contain information, for example variables x, y,
are bound to security classes. Any operation that uses the value
of x to calculate that of y, creates a flow of information from
x to y. This operation is only admissible if the class of y
dominates the class of x in the flow relation, formally written
δx v δy where δe denotes the class of entity e. The concept of
information flow classically stipulates that the security classes
together with the flow relation as an order relation on the
classes are a lattice [19], [17]. We differ here since we only
require a semi-lattice.
Information Flow Control for Active Objects: Information
is contained in data values which are here either objects or
activity references (see Section II-B). To apply the concept of
information flow control to configurations of active objects, we
need to interpret the above notions of security classes, their
flow relation, and the entities that are assigned to the security
classes: we identify the classes of our security model as the
security classes of methods and the flow relation as the semi-
lattice ordering on these classes (see Section II-A). Flows of
information local to objects are generated by local method
calls between neighboring methods of the same object. These
are regulated by the local L/H-classification of an object’s
methods (H may call L and H – but L only L). Global flows
result from remote method calls between objects’ methods.
The combined admissible flows have to be in accordance with
a concrete configuration and its L/H specification.
E. Enforcing Legal Information Flows
To illustrate the task of controlling information flows, we
first extend the intuition about information flow to configura-
tions of active objects. An active object sees only other active
objects that are directly referenced in its methods or those
active objects that are indirectly visible via public methods
of visible objects. From the viewpoint of one active object,
information may flow into the object and out of the object. For
each direction, there are two ways how information may flow:
implicit or explicit (direct) flows. Information flows explicitly
into an object by parameters passed to remote calls directed
to the object’s methods; it may also flow implicitly into the
object simply if the choice of which method is called depends
on the control flow of the calling object. Similarly, information
flows explicitly out of an active object by parameters passed
to remote method calls and implicitly out of it, if the choice
depends on the object’s own control flow. Some of these flows
are illustrated on our running example next.
Running Example: Implicit Information Flow: We will
now finally illustrate the security model on the running ex-
ample showing implicit information flows of active objects
introduced above in Section II-C. Let us assume that the
implementation of the β-objects featuring in the controller’s
list had the following implementation.
β
[
∅,
[ord = ς(y) if this.income/103≥1 then 1 else 0],
income = . . .]
Let us further assume that ord is again a public method and
income again the private field of β. We have here a case of an
implicit information flow. Since the guard of the if-command
in ord depends on the private field income, effectively the order
number of a β-object is 1 if the income of β is more than
1000 else 0. In our security model this control flow represents
an illicit flow of information from a high level value in β to
its public parts and is thus visible to the remote controller.
This should not be the case since H A L. It should thus be
detectable by an information flow control analysis. We will
show next how to detect it statically by a security type system.
IV. SECURITY TYPE SYSTEM
Before formalizing security of active objects and defining
a type system that implements rules for a static analysis, we
summarize the security considerations so far and motivate the
upcoming type system and proofs.
A. Intermediate Summary, Motivation, and Outlook
In a configuration of active objects we may have direct
(explicit) and implicit information flows through method calls
which are controlled differently.
• To guarantee only legal information flows on direct calls
we rely on the labeling of methods by L and H and on the
global hierarchy. This corresponds to the simple security
property of confinement: remote method calls can refer
only to low methods of visible objects. Confinement can
be locally checked. It is decidable since it corresponds to
merely looking up method labels in a security assignment.
• We will use a program counter PC that records the
current security level of a method evaluation. Locally,
within the confinement zone of an activity, accessing H-
methods in L-methods may create implicit flows – as
seen in the example. To detect such flows and protect
the confidential information from flowing out of the
confinement zone of the activity, the program counter
records these dependencies by increasing to H . In com-
bination with the method labels, the PC thereby allows
associating the calling context with the called method.
Implemented into type rules, this enables static checking
and thus controlling of information flows in evaluations
of configurations.
As a security enforcement mechanism of our multilateral
security model for active objects, we propose a security type
system, i.e., a rule set for static analysis of a configuration
with respect to its methods’ security assignment. The idea of
a security type system is as follows. Not all possible programs
in ASPfun are secure. In general, for example, any method
can be accessed in an active object. The purpose of a type
system for security is to supply a set of simple rules defining
types of configurations enabling a static check (before run-
time) whether those contain only allowed information flows.
The above described cases of information flows need to be
implemented in the type rules such that the rules allow to
infer a type just for secure configurations and otherwise reject
them. The first direct case of information flow is intuitively
simple, as it boils down to locally looking-up the security level
of a method before deciding whether a remote call from up
in the hierarchy can be granted. The “up in the hierarchy” is
encoded in a subtype relation v encoding the global hierarchy
described by the visibility relation. After the presentation of
the type system in this section, we prove in the following
Section V that confinement is a security property implied by
it.
How to avoid and detect implicit flows, is more subtle:
the combination of a program counter PC with the called
method’s security label grants us to combine the provenance
of one call with the security level of the call context. However,
this combination needs to adhere to the security specification
for all runs of a program and thus all possible calls in a context.
The appropriate notion of security for this is noninterference:
in all runs the observable (low) parts of configurations need
to look “the same”. Therefore, we first introduce a notion of
noninterference for active objects based on which we will
then be able to express the absence of implicit flows and
prove multilateral security. The definition of noninterference
and proofs of properties are contained in Section V. We first
introduce the type system.
B. Type System
Type Formation: We need to provide types for objects and
for configurations of active objects; the latter by mapping
names of futures and activities to object types. The two-
dimensional classification of local and global security de-
scribed above translates directly into the object types of the
security type system. A type is a pair ([li 7→ Si]i=1..n, δα)
where Si ∈ {L,H}. The first part [li 7→ Si]i=1..n provides
the partition of methods into public (L) and private (H)
methods for the object. The other element δα of an object
type represents the global classification of an object. This
global level corresponds to the classification of the object’s
surrounding activity α derived from its visibility. We adopt the
following naming conventions for variables. δ stands for the
global part of a type. We use A to denote security assignments,
e.g. A = [li 7→ Si]i=1..n. Si, or simply S, stands for levels
L or H . In general, we use indexed variables to designate
result values of a function, e.g., Si for the level value of
method li – also expressed as A(li). We use Σ for object
types Σ = ([li 7→ Si]i=1..n, δ). To map an object type Σ
to its security assignment or its global part, respectively, we
use the projections ass(Σ) and glob(Σ). We formally use
a parameter sec as the parameter for the overall methods’
security assignment of an entire configuration C. A triplet
of maps is a configuration type 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉 assigning
types to all activities and futures of a configuration in addition
containing the security assignment sec.
Typing Relations: A typing judgement T ;S ` x : ([li 7→
Si]
i=1..n, δ) reads: given type assumptions in T , term x has
type ([li 7→ Si]i=1..n, δ) in the context of a program counter
S ∈ {L,H}. A program counter (PC) is a common technique
in information flow control originating in Fenton’s Data Mark
Machine [21]. The PC encodes the highest security level that
has been reached in all possible control flows leading to the
current control state. In a functional language, like ASPfun, this
highest security level of all execution paths simply is the level
of the evaluation context for the term x. Thus, the PC is some
S ∈ {L,H} denoting the security label of the local context.
The type environment T contains types Σ for the parameter
variables y and types for the parameter this both paired with
the local security level S representing their local PC.
Subsumption Rules: Subsumption means that an element of
a type also has the type of its super-type. It is responsible for
making the partial order relation on global levels a subtype
relation. Intuitively, GLOB SUBSUMPTION says that if a term
can be typed in a low context it may as well be “lifted”,
i.e., considered as of higher global level thereby enforcing
(together with TYPE CALL below) that only L-methods can
be accessed remotely. This corresponds to the confinement
property as formally shown in Section V-B. The local security
class ordering is L ≤ H and features implicitly in the type
system in the form of a second – the local – subsumption rule.
Finally, the rule SECASS SUBSUMPTION allows the security
assignment type of an object to be extended. This rule is
necessary to consider an object also as a local object inside
another (active) object adopting its security assignment.
LOC SUBSUMPTION
T ;L ` x : (A, δ)
T ;H ` x : (A, δ)
SECASS SUBSUMPTION
T ;S ` x : (A, δ) A ⊆ A′
T ;S ` x : (A′, δ)
GLOB SUBSUMPTION
T ;L ` x : (A, δ) δ v δ′
T ;L ` x : (A, δ′)
TABLE II
SUBSUMPTION RULES, A = [li 7→ Si]i∈1..n , S ∈ {L,H}
VAL SELF
this :Σ :: T ;unionsqi∈1..nSi ` this :Σ
VAL LOCAL
x : Σ :: T ;S ` x : Σ
TYPE OBJECT
∀i ∈ 1..n.
this :Σ :: y :Σ :: T ;Si ` ti : Σ
T ;unionsqi∈1..nSi ` [li = ς(y)ti]i∈1..n : Σ
TYPE CALL
T ;S ` o : Σ
j ∈ 1..n T ;Sj ` t : Σ
T ;Sj ` o.lj(t) : Σ
TYPE UPDATE
T ;S ` o : Σ
j ∈ 1..n this :Σ :: y :Σ :: T ;Sj ` t : Σ
T ;S ` o.lj := ς(y)t : Σ
TABLE III
TYPE RULES FOR OBJECTS; Σ = ([li 7→ Si]i∈1..n, δ)
Object Typing: The object typing rules in Table III describe
how object types are derived for all possible terms of ASPfun.
The VAL-rules state that type assumptions stacked on the
type environment T left of the turnstile ` can be used
in type judgments. These rules apply to the two kinds of
environment entries for this and for the y-parameter. Since
the this represents the entire object value itself, its PC is
derived as the supremum of all security levels assigned to
methods in it. We express this supremum as the join over
all levels unionsqi∈1..nSi. The other rules are explained as follows.
TYPE OBJECT: if every method li of an object is typeable with
some local type Si ∈ {L,H} assigned to it by the assignment
component A of Σ, then the object comprising these methods
is typeable with their maximal local type. Thus, objects that
contain H methods cannot themselves be contained in other L-
methods. Otherwise, local objects containing confidential parts
could be typed with GLOB SUBSUMPTION at higher levels
(see the Appendix for a “borderline example” illustrating this
point). Only objects that are purely made from L-methods
can be accessed remotely in their entirety. Albeit this strong
restriction, the CALL rule permits selectively accessing L
methods of such objects (see below). The PC guarantees
that all method bodies ti are typeable on their given privacy
level Si. The rule TYPE CALL is the central rule enforcing
that only L methods can be called in any object – locally
or remotely. Initially, a call o.lj(t) can only be typed as
Σ = ([li 7→ Si]1=1..n, δ) for the δ of the surrounding object o.
Although the PC in the typing of o is (by TYPE OBJECT) the
maximal level of all methods, we may still call L-methods on
objects that are typed with PC as H . The PC in the typing
of the resulting call o.lj(t) is coerced to Sj , i.e., the security
level assigned to the called method. This prevents H methods
from being callable remotely while admitting to call methods
on objects that are themselves typed in a H-PC. Because of
the rule GLOB SUBSUMPTION any method call o.lj(t) : (A, δ)
can also be interpreted as o.lj(t) : (A, δ′) for δ v δ′ but this
is restricted to L contexts: a method call typeable in an H
context cannot be “lifted”, i.e., it cannot be interpreted as well-
typed with δ′; to prevent this, the PC in GLOB SUBSUMPTION
is L thus excluding CALL instantiations for methods lj with
Sj = H . UPDATE: an update of an object’s method is possible
but conservatively, i.e., the types must remain the same.
Configuration Typing: The rules for configurations (see
Table IV) use the union of all futures of a configuration.
Definition 4.1 (Future Domain): Let C be a configuration.
We define the domain of all futures of C.
domfut(C) ≡
⋃
{dom(Q) | ∃ α, a. α[Q, a] ∈ C} 
The rules for configurations anticipate two semantic prop-
erties of futures in well formed ASPfun configurations. We use
well-formedness of ASPfun configurations as defined in [28];
in brief: there are no dangling references.
Property 4.2 (Unique Future Home Activity): Every future
is defined in the request queue of one unique activity.
∀fk ∈ domfut(C). ∃!α[Q, a] ∈ C. fk ∈ dom(Q)
We denote this unique activity α as futactC(fk). 
Next, every future fk in a well formed configuration C is
created by a call to a unique label in its home activity.
Property 4.3 (Unique Future Label): Let α[Q, a] ∈ C be
the unique futlabC(fk). Then,
∀fk ∈ domfut(C). ∃!l ∈ dom(a). ∃t. a.l(t)→∗‖ Q(fk).
We denote this unique method label as futlabC(fk). 
We omit the configuration C for the previous two operators if
it is clear from context.
The configuration type rules link up types for activities and
futures with the local types of terms in active objects and
request lists (see Table IV).
TYPE ACTIVE allows to transfer the type of an object term
to its activation which coerces the types of activities and
activity references to coincide with the types of their defining
objects. This is achieved together with TYPE ACTIVE OBJECT
REFERENCE and the clause 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉,∅ ` a : Γact(α)
of TYPE CONFIGURATION.
TYPE FUTURE REFERENCE similarly assigns the types for
the future references in Γfut. For a given activity α, this rule
further coerces the PC for the typing of fk to coincide with
Aα(futlab(fk)), i.e., α’s security assignment applied to the
label that leads to the instance of fk.
The rule TYPE CONFIGURATION ensures consistency be-
tween the type maps Γfut, Γact, and the overall security
assignment sec. It looks rather complex but it essentially
only scoops up what has been prepared by the other rules.
The first two clauses ensure that the domains of activities
coincide with the configuration domain and similarly for
futures that the future type map Γfut is defined over precisely
all futures in all activities. The third clause integrates the
security specification sec to be respected by the individual
security assignments of activities. The last large clause of
TYPE CONFIGURATION specifies first that the activity types
assigned to activity references by Γact coincide with their
active object types. The second part of that clause addresses
the future types in Γfut. Note, that in the context of this
clause we may assume α = futact(fk) by Property 4.2. The
clause ensures that the types assigned by Γfut coincide with
the ones assigned by Γact to their home activity. Additionally,
this final clause ensures that the request Q(fk) must have the
type assigned by the future map Γfut for this future fk with
the PC that corresponds to the PC assigned by the security
assignment in the home activity.
C. Running Example: Type System Checks Example
For the sake of argument, we illustrate the application
of the type system with an inconsistent constraint on the
assignment sec for the example in Section II-C. The extended
implementation as discussed in Section III-E contains the
following changed ord function (we repeat the code here for
convenience).
β
[
∅,
[ord = ς(y) if this.income/103≥1 then 1 else 0],
income = . . .]
If we specify income as private, this extended version of the
running example may contain an implicit illegal information
flow. Any security assignment sec that fulfills the constraint
must be fallacious since the call βi.ord in the manager object
α reveals information about the confidential (H) value of in-
come. The type system rejects any such sec since no consistent
type can be inferred for the configuration in this case as we
illustrate next. The failed type checking thus proves that for
the extended configuration all specifications would have to
specify income 7→ L because the assumption income 7→ H
was inconsistent.
The global classification is derived according to the visibil-
ity relation (Definition 3.1) from the example’s configuration
TYPE ACTIVE
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉, T ;S ` a : Σ
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉, T ;S ` Active(a) : Σ
TYPE ACTIVE OBJECT REFERENCE
β ∈ dom(Γact)
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉, T,Mβ ` β : Γact(β)
TYPE FUTURE REFERENCE
fk ∈ dom(Γfut)
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉, T ; ass(Γfut(fk))(futlab(fk)) ` fk : Γfut(fk)
TYPE CONFIGURATION
dom(Γact) = dom(C) dom(Γfut) = domfut(C)
⋃
α∈dom(C)
ass(Γact(α)) ⊆ sec
∀α[Q, a] ∈ C.

〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉,∅;Mα ` a : Γact(α)∧
∀ fk∈dom(Q).
{
Γact(α) = Γfut(fk)∧
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉,∅; ass(Γact(α))(futlab(fk)) ` Q(fk) : Γfut(fk)
` C : 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉
TABLE IV
TYPING CONFIGURATIONS; Mα =
⊔
i∈1..nα ass(Γact(α))(i)
as δβi v δα for all i. To be able to type the call to βi.ord in
manager object α this method must be an L-method according
to TYPE CALL. Hence, we need to have the following extended
constraint on sec.
sec ⊇ {ord 7→ L, income 7→ H}
The third clause of TYPE CONFIGURATION, i.e.,⋃
α∈dom(C) ass(Γact(α)) ⊆ sec, gives us the constraint
ass(Γact(βi)) ⊇ {ord 7→ L, income 7→ H} since sec and
ass(Γact(βi)) are both functions.
We show now that βi (for an arbitrary i in the configuration)
cannot be typed with this type constraint. The final step in a
type inference to arrive at a type Γact(βi) for βi can only be
an instance of TYPE OBJECT which looks as follows.
INSTANCE TYPE OBJECT
this :Σβi :: [] :Σβi :: ∅;A(ord) ` tord : Σβi
this :Σβi :: [] :Σβi :: ∅;A(income) ` tincome : Σβi
∅;unionsq{A(ord), A(income)} `
[ord = ς(y) tord, income = ς(y) tincome] : Σβi
We write Σβi for Γact(βi), A = sec(Σβi), and tord =
if this.income/103≥1 then 1 else 0. In fact, a more technical
definition of tord is
tord = (((true.if := (this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)))
).then := 1).else:= 0).if([]).
where true is a boolean object containing methods if, then,
and else. The details of this boolean object and its typing
as well as the details of the following abridged reasoning are
contained in Appendices A and B. The main point that we can
see from this implementation is that the type A(ord) is coerced
by the type A(if), i.e., it must hold that A(ord) = A(if) in
Σβi . This is the case, because tord is a call to the method
if. According to the rule TYPE CALL, the PC must thus
be Sif which corresponds here to A(if) and coincides with
the PC A(ord) in the above instance of TYPE OBJECT, i.e.,
A(ord) = A(if). Now, the remaining argument just shows
that A(if) must be H . In short form, the reasoning for the
latter goes as follows. By assumption, A(income) must be H .
Thus according to TYPE CALL and VAL SELF, this.income
is typeable only with PC as H . We must apply TYPE CALL
twice, to type this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)). The PC for
typing this is H each time because it must be the same as
the PC (named Sj) in typing the parameter (named t in the
rule TYPE CALL) and the previous typing of the parameter
this.income has a H-PC. The PC in the application of the
rule TYPE UPDATE is then also coerced to H in the typing
of the newly inserted body method lj , here “if”. Hence, this
update coerces the PC Sif to be H , i.e., A(if) to be H .
The two following updates do not change the security type
of the method if. We are finished since as we have seen above
A(if) = A(ord). Thus, A(ord) must be H and cannot be typed
L as would be necessary to call this method remotely in α. The
typing fails. We have a contradiction to the initially required
specification that income be private. Since this was the only
assumption, if follows by contraposition that income must be
L to make the configuration typeable.
This illustrates the correctness of the type system by ex-
ample: the configuration C of our running example cannot be
typed with the constraint income 7→ H since any attempt to
infer a type 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉 for it fails. The type inference
reveals the dependency between ord and income: a security
leak because it would enable implicit information flows from
βi’s private part to χ.
In the following, we provide general proofs showing that
the type system is sound, i.e., it generally implies security not
just for the example.
V. PROPERTIES
A. Preservation
Type safety includes always a preservation theorem: if a
program can be typed, the type has to be preserved by the
evaluation of the program – otherwise the guarantees encoded
in the types would be lost. In our case, since configurations
dynamically change during the evaluation with the reduction
relation →‖, the preservation has a slightly unusual form
as the configuration type actually changes. But this change
is conservative, i.e., dynamically created new elements are
assigned new types but old types persist, as represented below
by ⊆. Alongside the configuration types, also the security class
lattice is extended likewise in a conservative way by extension
of the visibility relation.
Theorem 1 (Preservation):( ` C :〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉
C →‖ C′
)
⇒ ∃Γ′act,Γ′fut. ` C′ :〈Γ′act,Γ′fut, sec〉
where Γact ⊆ Γ′act and Γfut ⊆ Γ′fut.
The proof of this theorem has two parts. The first part shows
a local preservation property for the part of the type system
that describes secure method calls at the level of objects, i.e.,
the rules depicted in Tables II and III. The second part of the
proof addresses the typing rules at the global level, i.e., the
configuration typing rules depicted in Table IV. Both proofs
are straightforward using the induction schemes corresponding
to the inductive rule definitions of the type rule definitions.
Albeit the relatively small size of the computation model
ASPfun, these rules are fairly complex. Hence to avoid mistakes
in these proofs we have formalized them in Isabelle/HOL. The
Isabelle/HOL sources can be found at https://sites.google.com/
site/floriankammueller/home/resources.
B. Confinement
Confinement is the property of our type system encoding
the principal idea of the security model: if a method of an
object can be called remotely, it must be a public L method.
As a preparation to proving confinement, we present next a
chain of lemmas that lead up to it. Let o be an object and
T be an arbitrary type environment throughout the following
formal statements.
The type rules for subsumption allow that types of objects
can be “lifted”, i.e., objects can have more than one type. We
lose uniqueness of type judgments. To overcome this, we use
a well-known trick (already been used in the Hindley-Milner
type system for ML to accommodate polymorphic types) to
regain some kind of uniqueness: minimal types.
Definition 5.1 (Minimal Type): Define the minimal type in
the PC context of S ∈ {L,H} as follows.
T ;S `ML o : (A, δ) ≡

T ;S ` o : (A, δ)∧
∀S′, A′, δ′.
T ;S′ ` o : (A′, δ′)⇒
 S ≤ S′δ v δ′
A ⊆ A′

This provides at least that minimal types of local typings are
unique.
Lemma 5.2 (Minimal Type Uniqueness): Let S ∈ {L,H}.
If T ;S `ML o : (A, δ) and T ;S `ML o : (A′, δ′), then δ = δ′.
A slightly stronger form of that previous lemma exists for
H PCs.
Lemma 5.3 (High PC Uniqueness): If T ;H ` o : (A, δ)
and T ;H `ML o : (A, δ′), then δ = δ′.
Using slight generalization and contraposition, the previous
lemma can be strengthened to the following key lemma for
confinement.
Lemma 5.4 (Abstract Confinement): If T ;S ` o : (A, δ)
and δ0 @ δ and T ;S0 `ML o : (A, δ0), then S0 = L.
The following key fact, about the minimal type for futures
provides the anchor to apply Abstract Confinement and arrive
at Confinement.
Proposition 5.5 (Minimal Future Type): Let ` C :
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉, fk ∈ dom(Γfut), and α = futact(fk) the
home activity of fk. Then
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉, Aα(futlab(fk)) `ML fk : Γact(α) .
Theorem 2 (Confinement): If a future fk is typeable with an
arbitrary PC S as of type δ strictly larger than the global level
of fk’s home activity α, then fk has been initially generated
from a call to an L method of α. Formally, let ` C : 〈Γact ∪
sec,Γfut〉, α[Q, a] ∈ C, and fk ∈ dom(Q) with
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉, T ;S ` fk : (Ax, δ) where Γact(α) @ δ .
Then
Aα(futlab(fk)) = L .
The proof of confinement is basically just a combination
of Lemma 5.4 and Proposition 5.5. The chain of lemmas and
confinement have been proved in Isabelle/HOL as well.
C. Noninterference
Confinement can be considered as a simple security property
because it is similar to a safety property: confinement is
preserved on every trace of execution of a configuration.
Intuitively it seems to imply confidentiality of private parts but
this is only true for direct information flows. Confidentiality
necessitates that no information is leaked to an outsider even
considering implicit information flows as described in Section
III-C. Based on those observations, we define the general prop-
erty of confidentiality as noninterference, informally meaning
that an attacker cannot learn anything despite his ability to
observe configurations on all runs while comparing values
that he can see: a difference in the value of the same call
allows deductions about a change in hidden parts. The formal
definition of noninterference for active objects in general
[32] is a bisimulation over the indistinguishability relation
∼α on configurations. We omit the rather technical definition
of indistinguishability referring to Appendix D. Essentially,
indistinguishability says that C and C1 appear equal to the
attacker α’s viewpoint even if they differ in secret parts;
noninterference means that this appearance is preserved by
the evaluation of configurations.
Definition 5.6 (α-Noninterference): If configuration C is
indistinguishable to any C1 for α with respect to sec and
remains so under the evaluation of configurations →‖, then
C is α-noninterfering. Formally, we define α-noninterference
C sec as follows.(
C →‖ C ′
C ∼α C1
)
=⇒ ∃ C ′1.
(
C1 →∗‖ C ′1
C ′ ∼α C ′1
)
A main result for our security type system is soundness: a well-
typed configuration is secure; α-noninterference holds for the
configuration, i.e., it does not leak information.
Theorem 3 (Soundness): For any well-typed configuration
C, we have noninterference with respect to α ∈ C, i.e.,( ` C : 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉
α[Q, a] ∈ C
)
⇒ α-noninterference C sec .
The proof of this theorem is a case analysis distinguishing
the cases where a reduction step of the configuration has
happened in the α-visible part or outside it. In the latter
case, a difference in the visible part would mean a breach
of confinement. Within the visible part, a straightforward case
analysis shows that what is possible in one configuration must
also be possible in the other, indistinguishable, one, since those
parts are isomorphic; hence the same reduction rules apply. We
have formalized the definitions of indistinguishability, nonin-
terference, and multilateral security, as well as the statements
of the theorems in Isabelle/HOL – only the soundness proof
is not yet formalized but a detailed paper proof is contained
in Appendix E.
The parameterization of the attacker as an active object α
grants the possibility to adapt the noninterference predicate. If
we universally quantify α in our definition of noninterference,
we obtain a predicate where each object could be the attacker
corresponding to multi-lateral security.
Definition 5.7 (Multi-Lateral Security): If a configuration
C is α-noninterfering for all α ∈ dom(C) then multi-lateral
security holds for C.
Since no α is fixed in the type statement, the soundness
theorem holds for any α if the configuration is well-typed.
Hence, well-typing implies immediately multi-lateral security.
VI. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
The main difference of our approach is that we specifi-
cally address functional active objects. We also use a non-
standard security model [32] for multi-lateral security tailored
to distributed active objects. Other work on actor security,
e.g. [30], is based on message passing models different to
our high level language model. The paper [6] addresses only
direct information flows in active objects. The priority pro-
gram Reliably Secure Software Systems (RS3) of the German
Research Foundation (DFG) [34] addresses in its part project
MoVeSPAcI [42] security of actor systems using an event
based approach without futures.
The Distributed Information Flow Control (DIFC) approach
[39] provides support for Java programs (Jif) to annotate
programs with labels “Alice” and “Bob” for information flow
control. In this approach objects are not first class citizen.
The formal model [52] uses a lambda calculus λDSec to
accommodate the rich hierarchy of labels but (Java) objects
are not in the calculus. They use an elegant approach to prove
noninterference of a type system for labels pioneered by [43]
Pottier and Simonet. This approach does not apply to parallel
languages since the evaluation order of parallel processes is
not deterministic.
Reactive Noninterference, e.g. [36], [10], adopts a reactive
system view. Some of these works, e.g. [41], use a while
language in their formal models and bisimulation based non-
interference notions but the semantics is message passing by
events.
The language based approach has its beginnings in [51],
[50]. [49] offer the first model of language based information
flow control for concurrency, later refined by Boudol and
Castellani addressing scheduling problems and related timing
leaks. Many works have followed this methodology (see [48]
for an overview). However, most works consider imperative
while languages with various extensions like multi threading.
Barthe and Serpette [9] have considered security type systems
for ς-objects but no distribution. Later, Barthe and others [8],
[31] provide information flow control for Java-like languages.
Sabelfeld and Mantel consider message passing in distributed
programs [47], [35]. These works use the secure channel ab-
straction, i.e. connecting remote processes of the same security
class via secure channels integrating security primitives.
Distributed security has also been considered in many works
in the setting of process algebras most prominently using pi
calculus by [38] (see [24] and [46] providing overviews). Com-
monalities of process algebra based security to our work are
the bisimulation notion of noninterference and asynchronous
communication. The spi calculus by [3] extends the pi calculus
with constructs for encryption and decryption. It is thus a fore-
runner for current work that integrates encryption primitives
into languages, most prominently homomorphic encryption
[25]. The applied pi calculus [2] in contrast is a generalisation
of Milner’s original pi calculus with equational theories, i.e.
functions and equations. Thereby, extensions by cryptographic
primitives are possible. The applied pi calculus is used for
security protocol verification. An implementation is the model
checker ProVerif by [16]. There is a line of research on
mobile calculi that use purely functional concurrent calculi.
A few representative papers are by [29] on the pi calculus
and [27] for the security pi calculus. An impressive approach
on information flows for distributed languages with mobility
and states [37] first introduces declassification. Similar work
is by [11] also studying noninterference for distribution and
mobility for Boxed Ambients. [12] deviates from the applied
pi calculus generality focusing on core abstractions for security
in distributed systems, like secure channels [13]. In common
with these works are modeling distributed system by a calculus
but none of the pi calculus related work focuses on active
objects while we do not consider cryptographic primitives. An
interesting perspective would be to investigate the relationship
between confinement and effects of cryptographic primitives.
We also use a bisimulation-based equivalence relation to ex-
press noninterference. In the applied pi calculus, for example,
the notion of a static equivalence, similar to our indistinguisha-
bility is used in addition to observational equivalence that
corresponds to our notion of noninterference (see e.g. [18]).
This work presented a formal framework for the security of
active objects based on the semi-lattice security model that
propagates confinement. We presented a safe security type
system, that verifies the confinement property and is sound,
i.e., checks security, with respect to a dedicated formal notion
of noninterference, or more generally, multi-lateral security.
ASPfun makes secure down-calls possible and is still applica-
ble bi-directionally as illustrated by implementing the NSPK
protocol. The proofs have been in large parts formalized in
Isabelle/HOL. An implementation of functional active objects
is given by Erlang Active Objects in [22] also providing a
simple extension by a run-time monitor for confinement [23].
REFERENCES
[1] M. Abadi and L. Cardelli, A Theory of Objects. Springer-Verlag, New
York, 1996.
[2] M. Abadi and C. Fournet, “Mobile values, new names, and secure
communication,” in POPL, C. Hankin and D. Schmidt, Eds. ACM,
2001, pp. 104–115.
[3] M. Abadi and A. D. Gordon, “A calculus for cryptographic protocols:
The spi calculus,” in 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security. ACM Press, 1997, pp. 36–47.
[4] G. Agha, I. A. Mason, S. F. Smith, and C. L. Talcott, “Towards a theory
of actor computation (extended abstract),” in CONCUR’92: Proceedings
of the Third International Conference on Concurrency Theory, W. R.
Cleaveland, Ed. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1992, pp. 565–
579.
[5] R. Anderson, Security Engineering – A Guide to Building Dependable
Distributed Systems. Wiley, 2001.
[6] I. Attali, D. Caromel, L. Henrio, and F. L. D. Aguila, “Secured
information flow for asynchronous sequential processes,” Electr. Notes
Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 180, no. 1, pp. 17–34, 2007.
[7] A. Banerjee and D. A. Naumann, “Stack-based access control for secure
information flow,” Journal of Functional Programming, vol. 15, no. 2,
2003.
[8] G. Barthe, D. Pichardie, and T. Rezk, “A certified lightweight non-
interference java bytecode verifier,” in European Symposium on Pro-
gramming, ESOP’07, ser. LNCS. Springer, 2007.
[9] G. Barthe and B. P. Serpette, “Static reduction analysis for imperative
object oriented languages,” in LPAR, 2000, pp. 344–361.
[10] A. Bohannon, B. C. Pierce, V. Sjo¨berg, S. Weirich, and S. Zdancewic,
“Reactive noninterference,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, ser. CCS ’09. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 79–90. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1653662.1653673
[11] M. Bugliesi, G. Castagna, and S. Crafa, “Access control for mobile
ambients: the calculus of boxed ambients,” ACM Transactions on
Programming Languages and Systems, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 57–124, 2004.
[12] M. Bugliesi and R. Focardi, “Language based secure communication,”
in CSF. IEEE Computer Society, 2008, pp. 3–16.
[13] ——, “Channel abstractions for network security,” Mathematical Struc-
tures in Computer Science, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 3–44, 2010.
[14] D. Caromel, C. Delbe´, A. di Costanzo, and M. Leyton, “ProActive: an
integrated platform for programming and running applications on grids
and P2P systems,” Computational Methods in Science and Technology,
vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 69–77, 2006.
[15] D. Caromel, L. Henrio, and B. P. Serpette, “Asynchronous and deter-
ministic objects,” in Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN
symposium on Principles of programming languages. ACM Press, 2004,
pp. 123–134.
[16] V. Cheval and B. Blanchet, “Proving more observational equivalences
with ProVerif,” in 2nd Conference on Principles of Security and Trust
(POST 2013), ser. Lecture Notes on Computer Science, D. Basin
and J. Mitchell, Eds., vol. 7796. Rome, Italy: Springer Verlag, Mar.
2013, pp. 226–246. [Online]. Available: http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/
personal/bblanche/publications/ChevalBlanchetPOST13.html
[17] B. A. Davey and H. A. Priestley, Introduction to Lattices and Order (2.
ed.). Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[18] S. Delaune, S. Kremer, and M. D. Ryan, “Symbolic bisimulation for the
applied pi calculus,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 18, no. 2, pp.
317–377, 2010.
[19] D. E. Denning, “Lattice model of secure information flow,” Communi-
cations of the ACM, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 236–242, 1976.
[20] D. E. Denning and P. J. Denning, “Certification of programs for secure
information flow,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 20, no. 7, 1977.
[21] J. S. Fenton, “Information protection systems,” Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Cambridge, 1973.
[22] A. Fleck and F. Kammu¨ller, “Implementing privacy with erlang active
objects,” in 5th International Conference on Internet Monitoring and
Protection, ICIMP’10. IEEE, 2010.
[23] ——, “A security model for functional active objects with an implemen-
tation in erlang,” in Computational Informatics, Social Factors and New
Information Technologies: Hypermedia Perspectives and Avant-Garde
Experiences in the Era of Communicability Expansion. Blue Herons,
2011.
[24] R. Focardi and R. Gorrieri, “A taxonomy of security properties for
process algebras,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 5–34,
1995.
[25] C. Fournet, J. Planul, and T. Rezk, “Information-flow types for homo-
morphic encryptions,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security, Y. Chen, G. Danezis, and V. Shmatikov, Eds. ACM,
2011, pp. 351–360.
[26] R. H. Halstead, Jr., “Multilisp: A language for concurrent symbolic com-
putation,” ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems
(TOPLAS), vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 501–538, 1985.
[27] M. Hennessy and J. Riely, “Information flow vs. resource access in the
asynchronous pi-calculus,” ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., vol. 24,
no. 5, pp. 566–591, 2002.
[28] L. Henrio, F. Kammu¨ller, and B. Lutz, “Aspfun: A typed functional
active object calculus,” Science of Computer Programming, vol. 77, no.
7-8, pp. 823–847, 2012.
[29] K. Honda, V. T. Vasconcelos, and N. Yoshida, “Secure information flow
as typed process behaviour,” in ESOP, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, G. Smolka, Ed., vol. 1782. Springer, 2000, pp. 180–199.
[30] D. Hutter, H. Mantel, I. Schaefer, and A. Schairer, “Security of multi-
agent systems: A case study on comparison shopping,” J. Applied Logic,
vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 303–332, 2007.
[31] F. Kammu¨ller, “Formalizing non-interference for a small bytecode-
language in coq,” Formal Aspects of Computing, vol. 20, no. 3, pp.
259–275, 2008.
[32] ——, “A semi-lattice model for multi-lateral security,” in Data Privacy
Management, DPM’12, Seventh International Workshop. Co-located
with ESORICS’12, ser. LNCS, Security and Cryptology, vol. 7731.
Springer, 2013.
[33] G. Lowe, “An attack on the needham-schroeder public-key authentica-
tion protocol,” INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS, vol. 56, pp.
131–133, 1995.
[34] H. Mantel, D. Hutter, G. Snelting, and T. Nipkow, “Reliably secure
software systems – Priority Program of the German Research Foundation
(DFG),” 2010, http://www.reliably-secure-software-systems.de.
[35] H. Mantel and A. Sabelfeld, “A unifying approach to the security of
distributed and multi-threaded programs,” J. Computer Security, vol. 11,
p. 2003, 2002.
[36] A. A. Matos, G. Boudol, and I. Castellani, “Typing noninterference for
reactive programs,” J. Log. Algebr. Program., vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 124–
156, 2007.
[37] A. A. Matos and J. Cederquist, “Non-disclosure for distributed mobile
code,” Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, vol. 21, no. 6, pp.
1111–1181, 2011.
[38] R. Milner, Communication and concurrency, ser. PHI Series in computer
science. Prentice Hall, 1989.
[39] A. C. Myers and B. Liskov, “A decentralized model for information
flow control,” in Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM symposium
on Operating systems principles, ser. SOSP ’97. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 1997, pp. 129–142. [Online]. Available: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/268998.266669
[40] R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder, “Using encryption for authenti-
cation in large networks of computers,” Communications of the ACM,
no. 21, 1978.
[41] K. R. O’Neill, M. R. Clarkson, and S. Chong, “Information-flow security
for interactive programs,” in CSFW. IEEE Computer Society, 2006,
pp. 190–201.
[42] A. Poetzsch-Heffter and C. Feller, “Modular verification of security
properties in actor implementations (movespaci),” 2011, project of
the German Research Foundation, Priority Program RS3. [Online].
Available: http://softech.informatik.uni-kl.de/Homepage/MoVeSPAcI
[43] F. Pottier and V. Simonet, “Information flow inference for ml,” ACM
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 117–158, 2003.
[44] C. W. Probst and R. R. Hansen, “An extensible analysable system
model,” Information Security Technical Report, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 235–
246, Nov. 2008.
[45] C. W. Probst, J. Hunker, D. Gollmann, and M. Bishop, Eds., Insider
Threats in Cybersecurity. Springer, 2010.
[46] P. Ryan, S. Schneider, M. Goldsmith, G. Lowe, and B. Roscoe, The
Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols. Addison-Wesley, 2000.
[47] A. Sabelfeld and H. Mantel, “Static confidentiality enforcement for
distributed programs.” in Static Analysis Symposium, SAS’02, ser. LNCS,
vol. 2477. Springer, 2002.
[48] A. Sabelfeld and A. C. Myers, “Language-based information-flow secu-
rity,” Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 21, pp. 5–19, 2003.
[49] G. Smith and D. Volpano, “Secure information flow in a multi-threaded
imperative language,” in POPL’98. ACM, 1998.
[50] D. Volpano and G. Smith, “A type-based approach to program security,”
in TAPSOFT’97, ser. LNCS, vol. 1214. Springer, 1996.
[51] D. Volpano, G. Smith, and C. Irvine, “A sound type system for secure
flow analysis,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 167–187,
1996.
[52] L. Zheng and A. C. Myers, “Dynamic security labels and static informa-
tion flow control,” International Journal of Information Security, vol. 6,
no. 2–3, 2007.
APPENDIX
A: Booleans and conditional in the ς-calculus and their
security types
To prepare for the type inference, we need the implemen-
tation of the boolean datatype and the if-then-else in the ς-
calculus, i.e. in the local calculus of ASPfun.
true = [ if = ς(y)this.then(y),
then = ς(y)[], else = ς(y)[] ]
false = [ if = ς(y)this.else(y),
then = ς(y)[], else = ς(y)[] ]
if b then c else d =
((b.then := ς(y)c).else := ς(y)d).if([])
In the third line above, this, y /∈ FV (c)∪FV (d); [] denotes
the empty object. The definition shows how – similar to λ-
calculus – the functionality of the constructor is encoded in the
elements of the datatype: when b is true its method if delegates
to the method then, filled with term c, when false, if delegates
to else, executing term d.
Typing of the if-then-else construct is a base test for an
information flow type system as this construct is the basic
example that gives rise to implicit information flows. We will
thus here illustrate how the security type rules presented in this
paper establish that the guard of the if-then-else construct, the
if, must be typed with the same PC as the branches, i.e., then
and else. Then it immediately follows that if the method if
has H-PC then the branches must have H-PC as well. The
reasoning instantiates type rules showing the constraints that
follow for the security assignment in the security type Σifte.
A condition b in the method if of an if-then-else object
evaluates to either true or false. We consider those two
possibilities and infer their types and the resulting constraints.
To type true, we initially type this which can be done only
by rule VAL SELF leading to the following typing where
Σifte = (Aifte, δifte) is the security type for the if-then-else
object and Mifte = unionsq{Aifte(if), Aifte(then), Aifte(else)}. We use
the arbitrary set of additional type assumptions T provided by
the rule to integrate the type assumption for y already here. It
is needed further down for typing the object but only formally.
INSTANCE VAL SELF
this :Σifte :: (y :Σifte) :: T ;Mifte ` this :Σifte
We then apply the rule TYPE CALL to infer a type for
this.then. The following instance of that rule sets the parame-
ters such that it can be applied to the previous INSTANCE VAL
SELF.
INSTANCE TYPE CALL
this :Σifte :: y :Σifte :: T ;Mifte ` this :Σifte
this :Σifte :: y :Σifte :: T ;Aifte(then) ` [] :Σifte
this :Σifte :: y :Σifte :: T ;Aifte(then) ` this.then([]) :Σifte
Now, to type the true object including its fields then and
else we next need an instance of TYPE OBJECT.
INSTANCE TYPE OBJECT
this :Σifte :: y :Σifte :: T ;Aifte(if) ` this.then([]) : Σifte
this :Σifte :: y :Σifte :: T ;Aifte(then) ` [] : Σifte
this :Σifte :: y :Σifte :: T ;Aifte(else) ` [] : Σifte
T ;Mifte ` true = [ if = ς(y)this.then(y), then = ς(y)[], else = ς(y)[] ] : Σ
The main observation is that the following constraint must
hold for Aifte
Aifte(if) = Aifte(then)
because this is necessary for the first proviso of the above
instance to be matched with the previous type derivation for
this.then([]) by INSTANCE TYPE CALL.
With a very similar argument for typing false, i.e.,
this.else([]), we arrive at a similar constraint.
Aifte(if) = Aifte(else)
Since for an arbitrary if-then-else guard b we have to allow
both values true and false as possible outcome we have to
combine the constraints and conclude for Aifte the following
overall constraint.
Aifte(if) = Aifte(then) = Aifte(else)
The update of the methods then and else does not change
the PC and thus preserves the security assignment and the
constraints. This constraint is what we expect for information
flow security. If the guard of an if-then-else can only be typed
in a H-PC then its branches must also be “lifted” to H . Only
if the guard can be typed in a L-PC, can the branches also
be typed in L-PC.
Note on typing constants
In the above type rule instances we have used typings for
constants, for example, the empty object [] as granted and did
not refine them any further.
this :Σifte :: y :Σifte :: T ;Aifte(else) ` [] : Σifte
A word is in order to explain how these are constructed and
their types are derived. A simple way to integrate the empty
object into an activity is to add a method empty and then
replace all [] by this.empty. The security assignment should
be A(empty) = L. Then, we can use TYPE CALL to have
. . . L ` this.empty : Σifte and from there derive the above
. . . ;Aifte(else) ` this.empty : Σifte. However, [] (and other
commonly used plain objects) can more practically be con-
sidered as activities without any H methods that are included
as a “data base” in a configuration. Then, an occurrence of
[] is literally the activity named “empty object”, i.e., [] is an
activity reference. For the typing, the natural type of the empty
object is given as the empty security assignment ∅, i.e., the
partial function that is undefined for all inputs, and the bottom
element ⊥ of the visibility semi-lattice which corresponds to
the empty set of activity names.
〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉;L ` [] : (∅,⊥)
By definition this typing with L-PC as (∅,⊥) for the empty
object enables typing [] “into” any other activity type (A, δ)
because ∅ ⊆ A and ⊥ v δ. Thus – by SECASS SUBSUMP-
TION and GLOB SUBSUMPTION – . . . ;L ` [] : (A, δ).
A similar type and subtyping argumentation goes for other
constants, for example 0 or 1, used in the running example.
Similar to Church numerals simple term representation can be
given to them in ASPfun. Such constant activities η must have
their methods all assigned to L, i.e., their security assignment
A maps all method names of η to L. Then the PC of the
activity η is also L because it is given as unionsq{L} according to
the rule TYPE CONFIGURATION. The global level of a constant
activity like η is defined as the set {eta}. If the constant η is
used by referencing it in other activities of the configuration,
the name η becomes part of the other activities’ global levels.
B: Running Example – Details on Typing
The following shows why the example configuration pre-
sented as running example cannot be typed with income
7→ H ∈ sec.
Implementation
The quicksort function is described in Section II-C. The
manager activity that controls the ordering of a list and the
sorting object χ that calls the ord method in β-objects are
repeated here for convenience of the reader.
α
[
∅, [manage = ς(y)this.sort(this.list),
sort = ς(y) χ.qsort(y),
list = . . .]
]
χ
[
∅,
[qsort = ς(y) if y = [] then []
else let (a :: l) = y
(l1, l2) = this.part (a, l)
l′1 = if #l1≤1 then l1 else this.qsort(l1)
l′2 = if #l2≤1 then l2 else this.qsort(l2)
in l′1@[a]@l′2
end,
part = ς(p, y) if y = [] then ([], [])
else let (a::l) = y
(l1, l2) = this.part (p, l)
in if p<a.ord then (l1, a::l2) else (a::l1, l2)
end
]
]
The extended method ord that bears a dependency between
ord and income,
β
[
∅,
[ord = ς(y) if this.income/103≥1 then 1 else 0],
income = . . .]
is not typeable for any security assignment sec that imposes
the constraint that method income 7→ H . The following type
inference elaborates that the type system rejects any security
assignment that contains the constraint income 7→ H . It
illustrates how the security assignment Aβi = ass(Γact(βi))
is inferred.
Typing remote call implies ord 7→ L
Since the method ord is called remotely in χ via α we
need that ord 7→ L, which cannot be possible because of
the dependency in the above implementation. To be able to
type the call to βi.ord in the object χ this method must
be an L-method according to TYPE CALL and GLOB SUB-
SUMPTION. More precisely, let (Aβi , δβi) = Γact(βi). We
have that 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉,∅;Mβi ` βi : (Aβi , δβi) because
of TYPE ACTIVE OBJECT REFERENCE and βi ∈ dom(C).
The PC is Mβi = unionsqj∈domAβiAβi(j) where Aβi needs to
be inferred in the process. We can use next TYPE CALL
to type 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉,∅;Aβi(ord) ` βi.ord : (Aβi , δβi).
However, to type βi.ord in the context of the object χ it
needs to be typed as (Aβi , δχ) with global type component
δχ. This upgrading of the call can only be achieved by
application of rule GLOB SUBSUMPTION which requires that
δβi v δχ which is true but also requires that the PC of
the typing 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉,∅;Aβi(ord) ` βi.ord : (Aβi , δβi),
i.e., Aβi(ord), is L.
Typing βi.ord at global level δβi only with H-PC
The next part of the argument states that the only type that
can be inferred for a call βi.ord is T ;H ` βi.ord : (Aβi , δβi),
i.e., with H-PC. This is because types for calls can only be
inferred by rule CALL and Aβi(ord) = H which coerces the
PC according to rule CALL to H . For clarity of the exposition,
we omit in the following 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉 in front of the
typings. Since we want to arrive at ` C : 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉,
by the inversion principle of inductive type definitions, all
provisos of TYPE CONFIGURATION have to be true. Since
βi[∅, [ord = ς(y) tord, income = ς(y) tincome]] ∈ C,
the fourth proviso, first clause, of TYPE CONFIGURATION
yields
∅,Mβi ` [ord = ς(y) tord, income = ς(y) tincome] : (Aβi , δβi).
The coercion of Aβi(ord) to H is a consequence of the
typing of the object βi with an instance of rule TYPE OBJECT.
INSTANCE TYPE OBJECT
this :Σβi :: [] :Σβi :: ∅;Aβi(ord) ` tord : Σβi
this :Σβi :: [] :Σβi :: ∅;Aβi(income) ` tincome : Σβi
∅;Mβi ` [ord = ς(y) tord, income = ς(y) tincome] : Σβi
This instance enforces A(ord) to be the same as the PC in
the typing of
tord = if this.income/103≥1 then 1 else 0
= (((true.if := (this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)))
).then := 1).else:= 0).if([]).
The only way to arrive at a type for tord is by an application
of TYPE CALL as in the following instance.
INSTANCE TYPE CALL
T ;S ` (((true.if := (this. > 0(this.div103(this.income))))
.then := 1).else:= 0) : Σ
T ;Aβi(if) ` [] : Σ
T ;Aβi(if) ` tord : Σ
In order to match the conclusion of the above with the first
proviso of the earlier INSTANCE TYPE OBJECT, the security
assignment of ord is coerced to that of if
Aβi(ord) = Aβi(if).
We only need to show that Aβi(if) = H and we are finished.
Typing implies that Aβi(if) = H
The following chain of steps shows how a type for the body
of ord and thus Aβi(ord) must be inferred detailing how the
security assignment parameter Aβi(if) needs to be instantiated
to H . The chain of reasoning starts from the one specified
security assignment income 7→ H in sec and shows that then
also ord 7→ H which contradicts the above ord 7→ L. Hence,
no type can exist with the constraint income 7→ H for this
configuration.
Aβi(income) is H by constraint on sec and thus Aβi .
According to VAL SELF with
M = unionsq{Aβi(income), Aβi(ord), . . .} = H
we get the following typing for this.
T ;H ` this : (Aβi , δβi)
According to TYPE CALL, this.income is typeable only with
PC as H since {income 7→ H} ⊆ Aβi .
T ;H ` this.income : (Aβi , δβi)
The previous typing feeds into rule TYPE CALL again but
this time for the parameter t. Since the PC Sj matches with
H we get again a H-PC coercing the method div103 also to
be assigned to H in Aβi .
T ;H ` this.div103(this.income) : (Aβi , δβi)
In the same fashion, the previous considered as a parameter
typing TYPE CALL consequently coerces Aβi(> 0) also to H:
T ;H ` this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)) : (Aβi , δβi)
We instantiate UPDATE as follows.
INSTANCE TYPE UPDATE
∅;S ` true : (Aβi , δβi)
this :Σβi :: [] :Σβi :: ∅;Aβi(if) `
this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)) : (Aβi , δβi)
∅;unionsq{Aβi(if), . . . }) `
true.if[] := this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)) : (Aβi , δβi)
The first proviso, the typing for true can be inferred as
shown in the previous section, using rule SEC ASS SUBSUMP-
TION in addition to embed it into βi. We spell out some
portion of Mβi = unionsq{Aβi(if), . . . } above to emphasize that
Aβi(if) is part of the PC. The dots stand for Aβi(ord) and
Aβi(income) etc. To match the previous derivation above of
∅;H ` this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)) : (Aβi , δβi) to the
second proviso in the above instance it is necessary to coerce
Aβi(if) = H.
We are finished here already because we have already shown
above that Aβi(if) = Aβi(ord) which thus is H contradicting
the earlier requirement to be L.
For completeness, we continue the derivation of the body
of tord. From the previous step above, we get the conclusion
∅;H ` true.if[] := this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)) : (Aβi , δβi).
We can again instantiate the update rule.
INSTANCE TYPE UPDATE
∅;H ` true.if[] := this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)) : (Aβi , δβi)
this : (Aβi , δβi) :: y : (Aβi , δβi) :: ∅;H ` 1 : (Aβi , δβi)
∅;H ` this. > 0(this.div103(this.income)).then := 1 : (Aβi , δβi)
And a second time we instantiate TYPE UPDATE for 0 to
finally obtain
∅;H `
((this. > 0(this.div103(this.income))).then := 1).else := 0
: (Aβi , δβi)
Running Example: Typing Summary
The coercions revealed in the above steps determine the
parameter Aβi in summary as follows.
Aβi = [income 7→ H,
div103 7→ H,
> 0 7→ H
if 7→ H,
ord 7→ Sif]
I.e., the only possible instantiation for Aβi(ord) is H . We
cannot meet the required constraint Aβi(ord) = L necessary
to call it from the outside in χ as explained initially. Therefore,
the example configuration cannot be typed with the constraint
income 7→ H .
Borderline Example for Confinement
The confinement property states that remote calls can only
be addressed to L methods. But does this simple security
property guarantee that no hidden H methods can be returned
with the reply to such a call? Consider the following example
α[∅, [leak = ς(y)this, key = ς(y)n]]
where n is an integer representing a secret key. Let the security
assignment for α be {leak 7→ L, key 7→ H}. One may think
that an activity β could contain a call α.leak.key since the
method leak is L enabling the remote call to α.leak. Once the
call result is returned into β, it would evaluate to the active
object of α inside β (since this represents this active object of
α). Since we are now already in β, it might seem possible to
apply the method key to extract the key.
How does the security type system prevent this? Since the
typing for this inside α is only possible with the PC as Mα =
unionsqi∈{leak, key}Aα(i) = H (since Aα(key) = H), the typing for
this yields
INSTANCE VAL SELF this :Σα :: T ;H ` this : (Aα, δα).
Typing the object α must use the following instance of
TYPE OBJECT.
INSTANCE TYPE OBJECT
this :Σα :: y :Σα :: ∅;Aα(leak) ` this : Σα
this :Σα :: y :Σα :: ∅;Aα(key) ` n : Σα
∅;unionsq{Aα(leak), Aα(key)} ` [leak = ς(y)this, key = ς(y)n] : Σα
Now, matching the instance of VAL SELF for this with the
first proviso of the instance of TYPE OBJECT coerces Aα(leak)
to H contradicting the initial specification. I.e., the method
leak is forced to be H and cannot be called remotely.
C: Formal Semantics of ASPfun
For a concise representation of the operational semantics,
we define contexts as expressions with a single hole (•). A
context E[t] denotes the term obtained by replacing the single
hole by t.
E ::= • | [li = ς(y)E, lj = ς(yj)tj∈(1..n)−{i}j ] |E.li(t) |
s.li(E) |E.li := ς(y)s | s.li := ς(y)E|Active(E)
This notion of context is used in the formal semantics of
ASPfun in Table V and also in the definition of visibility (see
Definition 3.1).
D: Indistinguishability
In ASPfun active objects are created by activation, futures
by method calls. Names of active objects and futures may
differ in evaluations of the same configuration but this does
not convey any information to the attacker. In order to express
the resulting structural equivalence, we use typed bijections
like [7] that enable the definition of an isomorphism of
configurations necessary to define indistinguishability. This
technique of using the existence of “partial bijections” to
define an isomorphism between configurations only serves to
express equality of visible parts but is rather technical as it
needs to provide differently typed bijections for the involved
structure, e.g. futures, objects, and request lists.
Definition 6.1 (Typed Bijection): A typed bijection is a fi-
nite partial function σ on activities α (or futures fk respec-
tively) such that for a type T
∀ a : dom(σ). ` a : T =⇒ ` σ(a) : T.
By t[σ, τ ] =|sec t′ we denote the equality of terms up to
replacing all occurrences of activity names α or futures fk by
their counterparts τ(α) or σ(fk), respectively, restricted to the
label names in sec, i.e., in the object terms t and t′ we exempt
those parts of the objects that are private. The local reduction
with →∗ς of a term t to a value te (again up to future and
activity references) is written as t ⇓ te.
Definition 6.2 (Equality up to Name Isomorphism): An
equality up to name isomorphism is a family of equivalence
relations on ASPfun terms indexed by two typed bijections
(σ, τ) := R and security assignment sec consisting of the
following differently typed sub-relations; the sub-relation’s
types are indicated by the naming convention: t for ς-terms,
α, β for active objects, fk, fj for futures, Qα, Qβ for request
queues.
t=R t
′ ≡ t ⇓ te ∧ t′ ⇓ t′e ∧ te[σ, τ ] =|sec t′e
α=R β ≡ σ(α) = β
fk=R fj ≡ τ(fk) = fj
Qα=RQβ ≡

dom(τ) ⊇ dom(Qα)
ran (τ) ⊇ dom(Qβ)
∀ fk ∈ dom(Qα).
Qα(fk)=RQβ(τ(fk))

α[Qα, tβ ]=R β[Qβ , tα] ≡ α=R β ∧Qα=RQβ ∧ tα=R tβ
Such an equivalence relation defined by two typed bijections
σ and τ may exist between given sets V0, V1 of active object
names in C,C1. If V, V1 correspond to the viewpoints of
attacker α in C and its counterpart in C1 we call this
equivalence relation indistinguishability.
In the following, we use the visibility range based on
Definition 3.1 as V Isec(α,C) ≡ {β ∈ dom(C) | β vsecC α}.
Definition 6.3 (Indistinguishability): Let C,C1 be arbitrary
configurations, well-typed with respect to a security specifi-
cation sec, active object α ∈ dom(C) and α ∈ dom(C1)
(we exempt α from renaming for simplicity). Configurations
C and C1 are called indistinguishable with respect to α and
sec, if α’s visibility ranges are the same in both up to name
CALL
li ∈ {lj}j∈1..n
E
[
[lj = ς(yj)sj ]
j∈1..n.li(t)
]→ς E [si{this← [lj = ς(yj)sj ]j∈1..n, yi ← t}]
UPDATE
li ∈ {lj}j∈1..n
E
[
[lj = ς(yj)sj ]
j∈1..n.li := ς(y)t
]→ς E [[li = ς(y)t, lj = ς(yj)sj∈(1..n)−{i}j ]]
LOCAL
s→ς s′
α[fi 7→ s ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ s′ ::Q, t] :: C
ACTIVE
γ /∈ (dom(C) ∪ {α}) noFV(s)
α[fi 7→ E[Active(s)] ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ E[γ] ::Q, t] :: γ[∅, s] :: C
REQUEST
fk fresh noFV(s) α 6= β
α [fi 7→ E[β.l(s)] ::Q, t] :: β[R, t′] :: C →‖ α [fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: β
[
fk 7→ t′.l(s) ::R, t′
]
:: C
SELF-REQUEST
fk fresh noFV(s)
α [fi 7→ E[α.l(s)] ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α [fk 7→ t.l(s) :: fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: C
REPLY
β[fk 7→ s ::R, t′] ∈ α[fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: C
α[fi 7→ E[fk] ::Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ E[s] ::Q, t] :: C
UPDATE-AO
γ /∈dom(C)∪{α} noFV(ς(x, y)s) β[R, t′]∈α[fi 7→ E[β.l:=ς(x, y)s] ::Q, t] ::C
α[fi 7→ E[β.l := ς(x, y)s] :: Q, t] :: C →‖ α[fi 7→ E[γ] :: Q, t] :: γ[∅, t′.l := ς(x, y)s] :: C
TABLE V
ASPFUN SEMANTICS
isomorphism.
C ∼α C1 ≡ ∃ σ, τ.

V Isec(α,C) = dom(σ)
V Isec(α,C1) = ran (σ)
∀ β ∈ V Isec(α,C).
C(β) =σ,τ C1(σ(β))

As an example for α-indistinguishable configurations con-
sider the running example. In the original (non-fallacious)
form, β1.income could be 42 in configuration C and it could be
1042 in configuration C ′. Since income is specified as H those
two configurations can be considered as α-indistinguishable
(with respect to β1). Attacker α sees no difference between
the two. In the fallacious example, however, he’d notice a
difference when calling the quicksort algorithm that implicitly
drafts information from income through ord: here, C and C ′
would be distinguishable since β1.ord is 0 in C and 1 in C ′.
E: Noninterference Proof
Theorem 2 (Soundness) For any well-typed configuration,
we have noninterference with respect to α ∈ C, i.e.,( ` C : 〈Γact,Γfut, sec〉
α[Q, a] ∈ C
)
⇒ α-noninterference C sec .
Proof:
Let C1 be another arbitrary but fixed configuration such that
C ∼α C1. This means that for any β ∈ dom(C), if β ∈
visibility range of α – we have that σ(β) ∈ dom(C1) and
C(β) =σ,τ C1(σ(β)) for some τ and σ. That is, aside
differently named futures (and active object references) these
two activities are structurally the same and contain the same
values. For the sake of clarity of the proof exposition, we leave
the naming isomorphism implicit, i.e. use the same names,
e.g., β, fk, for both sides, i.e., for β, σ(β) and fk, τ(fk). Note,
that the type of the configurations C ′ and C ′1 is in some cases
an extension to the types of C and C1, as described in the
Preservation Theorem 1.
The proof is an induction over the reduction relation com-
bined with a case analysis whether an arbitrary β ∈ dom(C)
is in the visibility range of α or not.
If, for the first case, C →‖ C ′ by some reduction according
to the semantics rules in the part of the configuration that
is not visible to α, then for most cases trivially no change
becomes visible by the transition to C ′: for any local reduction,
this is the case since the visibility relation is unchanged.
Hence, “invisible” objects remain invisible. If C ∼α C1 and
C →‖ C ′, then also C ′ ∼α C1 whereby we trivially have the
conclusion since C1 →∗‖ C1 (in zero steps). This observation
is less trivial for the rules REQUEST and ACTIVE where new
elements, futures and activities, respectively, are created. In the
case of REQUEST, let β[fk 7→ E[γ.l(t)] :: Qβ , tβ ] ∈ C and
γ[Qβ , tγ ] ∈ C with β in the α-invisible part and γ visible to α.
The fact that there are no side effects provides that request fm
created in the request step in γ, i.e. γ[fm 7→ tγ .l(t) :: Qγ , tγ ]
in C ′, is not α-visible.
Similarly, if a new activity γ is created from a method in
β according to ACTIVE, then γ will not be in the visibility
range of α since β was not visible to α by Definition 3.1 of
the visibility relation. Thus, for β not visible to α, if C ∼α C1
and C →‖ C ′, then also C ′ ∼α C1 and the conclusion holds
again because C1 →∗‖ C1. This closes the case of non-α-visible
reductions.
If C →‖ C ′ by some reduction in the α-visible part, we need
to consider all cases individually as given by the induction
according to the semantics rules.
If C →‖ C ′ by semantics rule REQUEST then C must
have contained β[fk 7→ E[γ.l(t)] :: Qβ , tβ ] and γ[Qγ , tγ ]
for some β, fk, and γ. Hence, β[fk 7→ E[fm] :: Qβ , tβ ] and
γ[fm 7→ tγ .l(t) :: Qγ , tγ ] in C ′ for some new future fm. Since
β is α-visible, so is γ by definition of visibility (since fk was
created from tβ , tβ must have an L-method containing γ). By
confinement, fm has global level δβ and l is L. Since C ∼α
C1, and β, fk, γ visible to α, we have (up to isomorphism
of names) that β[fk 7→ E[γ.l(t)] :: Qβ , tβ ] and γ[Qγ , tγ ] in
C1. Therefore, we can equally apply the rule REQUEST to
C1 to obtain that C ′1 contains β[fk 7→ E[fm] :: Qβ , tβ ] and
γ[fm 7→ tγ .l(t) :: Qγ , tγ ]. In C1, γ is also α-invisible and l is
typed L as well. Now, the α-visible parts of C ′1 are equal to
the ones of C ′ apart from the new future fm. However, based
on the future bijection τ that exists due to indistinguishability
between C and C1 we can extend this for fm to a bijection τ ′.
In addition, by preservation, C ′ as well as C ′1 are well-typed
whereby finally C ′ ∼α C ′1 and this finishes the REQUEST-case.
Another, also less obvious case for new elements in the α-
visible part, is the one for ACTIVE. However, here we have
a very similar situation as in the REQUEST case. If, in C,
there is some β[fk 7→ E[Active(t)] :: Qβ , tβ ], we also have
β alike in C1, whereby we get in the next step – according
to rule ACTIVE – β[fk 7→ E[γ] :: Qβ , tβ ] ‖ γ[∅, t] in C ′
replacing the previous β. We can also apply ACTIVE in C1 so
that β[fk 7→ E[γ] :: Qβ , tβ ] ‖ γ[∅, t] in C ′ and C ′1 as well
instead of just the old β. Indistinguishability is preserved since
a bijection σ′ exists as extension to σ to the new activity γ
and by preservation again C ′ and C1 remain well-typed. We
are finished with the case for ACTIVE since C ′ ∼α C ′1.
The other cases, corresponding to the remaining semantics
rules, are of very a similar nature. Thus, the second part of
α-visible parts of the configurations C and C1 is also finished
and completes the proof of the theorem. 
